The CSP comes closest, recently publishing the Team B II Report and a supplement to that report, 10 Failures Of The U.S. Government On The Domestic Islamist Threat. Both, however, miss the most important issue of Muslim terrorism; Muslims. The supplement does enumerate a number of failings of the U.S. government regarding 10 infamous Muslims who worked at the highest political and administrative levels to help Muslim terrorism directed against the U.S.
Albert Einstein once defined insanity as "doing the same thing over and over again expecting different results." At the heart of the Team B II project is the belief that the Team A approach of our government to the Islamist threat, i.e. the received wisdom of the political, law enforcement, military and intelligence establishment, has proved to be a serial failure. In fact, we would be hard-pressed to find many instances in which the government Team A actually got it right. Rather than attempt to get it right, the establishment seems content to double-down on failure.
What follows are the most egregious and glaring failures of our national security agencies' approach. This whitepaper compiles a representative sample of ten cases, but easily a hundred or more cases could be presented. These examples range chronologically from incidents that occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s, to events that have happened within the past few weeks prior to the publication of this paper. From the first Bush 41 Administration to the current Obama Administration, the degree of failure is non-partisan. These cases also cover the gamut of federal agencies and departments, along with a few examples on the state and local level, showing that no segment of our government holds a monopoly on failure on this issue. The problem is universal.
Each of these cases is rooted in a fundamental failure by those government officials responsible to identify the nature of the threat. At their root these examples demonstrate what Team B II author and former federal prosecutor Andrew McCarthy has called "willful blindness." For government officials who have sworn an oath to protect and defend the Constitution, however, their "willful blindness" is a breach of their professional duty to know, to understand and to respond.
It should also be noted that each of these cases has been brought to the public and elected officials' attention before. In most cases, no action was taken despite public outcry. We hope that the winners of last week's election will finally take responsibility for the nation's security and take action against this threat of Shariah and Islamic terrorism. Sources are provided so anyone-- media, public, and policymaker-- can understand the extent of the problem and investigate how our political, civic and religious leadership have allowed this threat to advance so far.
Admirably, the Obama administration's May national security strategy explicitly lists as one of its goals "empowering communities to counter radicalisation." But without identifying the ideology driving radicalisation, it will be difficult to build community resilience against radicalisers.
No standardised explanation can account for every case of radicalisation. Yet it is clear that improved integration of immigrant communities and a greater sense of national social cohesion are essential to redressing local grievances and can lower the susceptibility of these communities.
At the same time, it is necessary to challenge and defeat the extremist ideology being peddled by radicalisers: our ultimate adversaries are not those already radicalised but their extremist ideology that propels individuals to wage violent jihad.
The ideology being espoused -- radical Islamism -- is an extremist sociopolitical ideology separate from the religion of Islam. Failure to recognise its influence as a key driver that seeks to frame, motivate and justify violent extremism hampers efforts to intervene early in the radicalisation process.
Since 9/11, US efforts to counter radical Islamism have included varied community engagement, counter-radicalisation and tactical counter-terrorism initiatives. Programs have been expanded to advance global engagement and strategic communication abroad, and community engagement and town hall meetings with immigrant communities at home.
At the other end of the spectrum, counter-terrorism officials have concentrated not only on preventing plots from being hatched but on developing fissures among al-Qa'ida, affiliated terror groups and their supporters.
However, the CSP and the Counterterrorism both miss the easiest and most effective tactic to counter Muslim terrorism: controling Muslims through immigration controls. All of the problem Muslims that CSP identified and the radicalization of Muslims that CTB is deeply concerned about is worthless as a counterterrorism strategy as both do not address the influx of Muslims into the United States. No counter radicalization program or more thorough screening of Muslims in the government will be sucessful as neither strategy counters the growing numbers of radicalized Muslims in the U.S. and the community that, as Mao Tse-tung pointed out, they swim in. The success of the radicalized Muslim is not just those Muslims radicalized and working for jihad, but the extended coummunity they operate out of that offers them concealment and protection.
And now between the community they hid in and the general influence of that community to protect them, any effort to counter radicalization or identify the radicals themselves is doomed to failure. Only controlling, then reducing the Muslim population, that is growing exponentially due to immigration, has any hope of success. Counter radicalization is doomed because the Muslim community and leadership are firmly in the hands of those already radicalized or, as was said about Spain or Sweden during WWII, neural in favor of the radicals. There are few if any moderate Muslims and the few have no influence. The most committed to Islam are the most radical and the most moderate are the least committed to Islam. Those who are committed to Islam lead it here and throughout the world. Therefore only a program of ending Muslim immigration and aggressive immigration law enforcement can end the problem. The goal should be to reduce the Muslim population to that it was in the late 50s when they had no power or influence, and feared and cowered before the forces of America: the FBI, the INS, and Christian American culture. This should be little problem as large numbers of Muslims are here illegally or participate in terrorism financing and are easy targets for deportation. Islam is only expanding because of immigration and Muslims also tend to loose significant numbers due to American culture. Their fecundity is a problem, but welfare cuts would also help there, as most radicals are incapable of holding any employment. Once they radicalize then tend to leave employment, much like the Times Square Bomber and Farooque Ahmed. They just can't stand such close proximity to non-Muslims.
So, our counterterrorism community needs to get with the program. Immigration is the key to security. End Muslim immigration and you end the Muslim terrorism problem.