Illegal immigration is not an intractable problem. It is not a difficult crime to either investigate or prosecute. It is not a problem that is demanding of the Federal government. Its solutions are fairly simple, do not require extensive resources, and can be quickly brought to a successful conclusion.
The radical left portrays the problem as filled with deadly import. Any illegal deport to them is nothing more than a death sentence or crime against humanity. In fact, immigration to them is a right to be exercised by the alien, and not a process to be regulated, controlled and supervised by the state. Of course, like most rights, they only exist for the left to be used against the United States and its people. The ultimate purpose of immigration to the left is to bring down whitey. And if Black Run America suffers for it as well, then that is just too bad, so sad. But black people, like immigrants, are just a Neo-Communist tool, being that the working class has been a complete disappointment to Communists. Therefore any reasoning, any tactic, any issue du jour, is acceptable for the Left to use to its goal.
That is the big picture, but what of the small picture of the in and out of a successful immigration enforcement strategy that the Communists would see as a dagger aimed at the heart of its program?
The esteemed James Fulford writing at VDare.com wrote asking a question. Why doesn’t the Broken Windows Theory of crime fighting not apply to immigration enforcement? Silly boy. It does. It just isn’t implemented. And for a variety of reasons. But that is not enough. But it is a good start.
But why would this not also apply to immigration enforcement? The (federal) authorities are refusing to arrest illegals who are plainly visible, claiming that they're focusing protecting the country from major criminals. So they can't find time to arrest people who are publicly protesting ,saying "we're illegal" or "you can't deport us all".
The federal government is in effect saying that, after all these years of non-enforcement , they've let the problem grow so big that they can't do anything.
Of course, we now know, thanks to Federale 's reporting on the Obama Administrative Amnesty, that the government doesn't want to do anything.
Both its insufficiency and its imperative are found in immigration enforcement’s history. Scattershot attempts at immigration control began basically with the Immigration Act of 1882 and Chinese Exclusion Act of the same year, a misnomer, since only Chinese workers were excluded, but not members of the Chinese merchant class or Chinese students, intellectuals or missionaries. Chinese merchants, their families, and servants were routinely allowed entry into the United States. In fact the Chinese merchant class, as corrupt as any, routinely sold their names to aspiring Chinese immigrants. As an employee of the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service I dealt with an interesting case of a Chinese merchant’s wife, paroled into the United States in the late 1920s, but who never adjusted to that of legal permanent resident who came to the Service’s attention in the mid-90s. Of interest is that San Francisco’s Mayor, Ed Lee, is a “paper son” brought here ostensibly legally during the so-called Chinese Exclusion Act. Both her story and that of Ed Lee show the disconnect between immigration enforcement legislation and actual immigration law enforcement. The pernicious influence of wealthy Chinese merchants also set the pattern of the failure of immigration enforcement over the years.
The United States did not get serious, or more accurately, just merely interested in immigration enforcement until 1924 when the U.S. Border Patrol was created. Previously immigration enforcement was practically non-existent. There was no systematic enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion act aside from the then U.S. Immigration Service’s haphazard enforcement on the Mexican border. Note prior to 1924 and many years afterward, Mexican immigration was unrestricted. The restrictions in the Immigration Act of 1924 was the major impetus of consolidating and professionalizing immigration law enforcement. Slow administrative and legal consolidation eventually resulted in the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which led and directed immigration law enforcement until 2003.
The INS was a symbol of the managerial state. It acted tirelessly to professionalize its enforcement, bringing ever better quality employees on board, creating a cadre of Border Patrol Agents, Special Agents, Deportation Officers and Adjudicators that were mostly university educated and had long field experience, usually starting with service in the Border Patrol, then progressing to various higher paid positions in the interior of the United States.
However, it never had a J. Edgar Hoover, who was able to create and sustain a professional organization resistant to the pernicious influence of the political class, not create an esprit de corps that help immunize it from corruption. Political influence was to be the bane of the INS, manifesting itself more in the norm than the exception.
Dwight Eisenhower saw that problem, and chose to go to the well he knew best, a fellow general, Joseph Swing, to head the INS and, more importantly, to solve the problem of Mexican illegal immigration, not only at the border, but in the interior.
The problem was the same as that created by the Chinese Exclusion Act. Wealthy merchants purchased entry to the United States with false documents, creating “paper sons” who were exempt the “exclusion” of Chinese. Similarly, wealthy ranchers and farmers purchased “exemptions” from hiring Mexican illegal immigrants from corrupt Border Patrol Sector Chief Patrol Agents and INS District Directors.
Christian Science Monitor July 6, 2006
Although there is little to no record of this operation in Ike's official papers, one piece of historic evidence indicates how he felt. In 1951, Ike wrote a letter to Sen. William Fulbright (D) of Arkansas. The senator had just proposed that a special commission be created by Congress to examine unethical conduct by government officials who accepted gifts and favors in exchange for special treatment of private individuals.
General Eisenhower, who was gearing up for his run for the presidency, said "Amen" to Senator Fulbright's proposal. He then quoted a report in The New York Times, highlighting one paragraph that said: "The rise in illegal border-crossing by Mexican 'wetbacks' to a current rate of more than 1,000,000 cases a year has been accompanied by a curious relaxation in ethical standards extending all the way from the farmer-exploiters of this contraband labor to the highest levels of the Federal Government."
Years later, the late Herbert Brownell Jr., Eisenhower's first attorney general, said in an interview with this writer that the president had a sense of urgency about illegal immigration when he took office.
America "was faced with a breakdown in law enforcement on a very large scale," Mr. Brownell said. "When I say large scale, I mean hundreds of thousands were coming in from Mexico [every year] without restraint…"
Profits from illegal labor led to the kind of corruption that apparently worried Eisenhower. Joseph White, a retired 21-year veteran of the Border Patrol, says that in the early 1950s, some senior US officials overseeing immigration enforcement "had friends among the ranchers," and agents "did not dare" arrest their illegal workers.
Walt Edwards, who joined the Border Patrol in 1951, tells a similar story. He says: "When we caught illegal aliens on farms and ranches, the farmer or rancher would often call and complain [to officials in El Paso]. And depending on how politically connected they were, there would be political intervention. That is how we got into this mess we are in now."
The advent of the Eisenhower Administration, adherents of the managerial state but with a sense of honor received from the top down from the Code at the U.S. Military Academy, as opposed to the habits of corruption endemic in the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations, think Pendergast Machine, changed things briefly at the INS.
During the 1950s, however, this "Good Old Boy" system changed under Eisenhower – if only for about 10 years.
In 1954, Ike appointed retired Gen. Joseph "Jumpin' Joe" Swing, a former West Point classmate and veteran of the 101st Airborne, as the new INS commissioner.
Influential politicians, including Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson (D) of Texas and Sen. Pat McCarran (D) of Nevada, favored open borders, and were dead set against strong border enforcement, Brownell said. But General Swing's close connections to the president shielded him – and the Border Patrol – from meddling by powerful political and corporate interests.
The result was Operation Wetback, a humane but vigorous immigration enforcement program that resulted in the removal of 3 million illegal aliens to Mexico, not just by arrests, but by frightening illegals, encouraging them to flee, or as well call it today, self-deport.
But the problem that confronted Eisenhower however still exists:
Bill Chambers, who worked for a combined 33 years for the Border Patrol and the then-called US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), says politically powerful people are still fueling the flow of illegals.
Think here the reappearing of the Chinese influence under Billy Jeff Bentpecker and his Chinese connections in place of the LBJ’s ranchers, farmers, and other consumers of low wage workers, what we now know as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the force majeure of the Jorge Bush and Obama Regimes, because it is still all about the Benjamins.
They say personnel is policy, and nothing is more true. Jumpin’ Joe Swing and J. Edgar proved that. This brings us to the current state of immigration law enforcement. We must answer Fulford’s question: So why doesn’t the Broken Windows Theory apply to immigration enforcement? Well, because of the people. Truman, LBJ, Clinton, Bushes, Obama. Some more corrupt than others. Some, like Reagan, were hoodwinked.. one hopes. But with the last three, Clinton, Jorge Bush, and Obama, it is both filthy lucre and ideology. Whether it is selling out to the Chinese or the Chamber, the white self-hatred of Clinton or Bush, tempering the Constitution with “compassion,” or just hating whitey from Obama. That is why the Broken Windows Theory does not apply.
Not because it would not work. It would be a great start, but more would be necessary.
What is to be done? What would be a systematic immigration enforcement strategy. Obviously one must first look to personnel. And at the top is fount. Personnel is policy. And like a fish, an immigration law enforcement strategy will stink from the head down. If the President stinks, there is no hope. There is a reason that the Broken Windows Theory was not applied during the Jorge Bush Regime. He did not want it. The same with Obama. Both were ideologically opposed to enforcement. Plus it did not attract Chamber support and money. Nor did an effective enforcement strategy attract donations from George Soros, Google, the Hilton or Marriott families.
So, elections do matter, more than one would think. The beltway immigration groups will not touch impeachment with the proverbial 10-ft pole. They are fine on criticizing Perry or Gingrich, but have made no effort on the proactive side, supporting Bachmann or even the doppelgänger Romney now in his enforcement manifestation.
But what would a coherent and effective immigration law enforcement strategy look like with the proper personnel, under a new Jumpin’ Joe Swing?
Obviously some of the tactics of Operation Wetback, and its public manifestation, would be out. But the underlying enforcement strategy was and is still sound. And it can work severed from the public aggressiveness that would be so difficult today.
In fact, under the radar immigration enforcement similar to Operation Wetback existed under Nixon, Ford and Carter. It was the heyday of the U.S. Border Patrol and INS. Not as powerful or exempt from political influence as under Eisenhower, but it built on Wetback and struck fear into the hearts of illegal aliens.
Today, the immigration enforcement arms may be large, but they are not feared as the INS and Border Patrol of late were. They operated mostly independently, with a sense of mission and hardheadedness unknown today. Enforcement today under the mislabeled U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), besides being torn by a dual and conflicting mission of both immigration and customs missions, a problem that could be overcome but won’t under the current Regime, is non-existent. Just ask the illegals at Pacific Steel. They are out of a job, but not out of the United States. That would have been unheard of under Ford, Nixon, Carter, or Reagan. From the top down, Janet Reno Napolitano and John Morton, are contemptuous of the Constitution, immigration law, and the mission of the Department of Homeland Security. Now as Fulford and I have pointed out, violation of immigration law is flagrant and public. There is no fear of the feckless ICE. Whether it is Chipotle, Jessica Colotl, or Muslim terrorists, there is no concern about being arrested or removed.
What can work is simple, yet aggressive enforcement of current laws. The National Rifle Association is known for its strategy on gun control of saying just enforce the laws we have. Not a great idea on the 2nd Amendment, but a really good start regarding immigration enforcement, providing you have the right personnel. Under current law, aggressive enforcement throughout the country, it does require a return to interior enforcement, would be both cost effective and have an impact.
Changes to the law would help. Three are mandatory E-Verify, expansion of expedited removal, and consolidation of the legacy INS agencies, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Customs and Border Protection, and ICE, to one border and enforcement agency.
I propose absorbing all into an expanded U.S. Border Patrol. That name still strikes fear into the heart of illegal aliens. They instinctively fear it. The name itself conveys a sense of mission and demands respect from aliens, both legal and illegal. The Fear Factor in this expanded USBP would be devastating on its face to the morale of illegal aliens. The yet uncrushed esprit de corps of the Patrol is still strong. It also still holds the institutional memory of skill set needed for immigration enforcement, something atrophying in ICE and parts of CBP, which is losing knowledge of immigration law and policy, not only with the corruption of legacy U.S. Customs Service employees who just do not care about immigration enforcement, but also a horrid lack of training in immigration law. ICE is so unconcerned about immigration enforcement, it no longer trains its Special Agents in any meaningful way in immigration law. And those in ICE who enforce immigration law, Deportation Officers, are the red-headed step-children of ICE. Just ask Chris Crane, ICE union representative who has repeatedly called out the Regime and John Morton by name on the issue of the Administrative Amnesty.
There, of course, is the answer to Fulford’s question. Personnel is policy. Change the personnel, starting at the top, replace Obama and the Trumanesque hacks at DHS with some Jumpin’ Joe Swings, and the question is answered. It doesn’t apply because the people in charge don’t want to apply it. They want to elect a new people. Or get cheap labor. Or both. But if you did apply it, a Swingesque figure could successfully apply it and get Giuliani like results.